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I’d like to begin my remarks with two completely unoriginal 
observations. The first is that United States is a nation that rests on ideas, 
in a sense that isn’t quite true of many other nations. What we mean by, 
say, Denmark, or my ancestral country of Wales, certainly is tied up with 
ideas about what it means to be Danish or Welsh. To be Welsh is, among 
other things, to belong to a nation of poets: the greatest cultural 
achievement for any Welshman or woman—leaving aside organized 
sports!—is to be crowned Bard (chief poet) at the National Eisteddfod. 
But the ideas that characterize Denmark or Wales belong to a national 
community that did not begin with ideas and a conscious decision. There 
was no convention that established Denmark, no declaration that 
announced Wales, and it is pointless to ask when either nation was 
created.1 Both emerged out of “the mists of time,” out of a particular 
human experience of geography, culture, language, religion, perceived 
physical kinship, and so on. But the ideas that characterize Denmark or 
Wales are not primarily political, and their national identity is distinct 
from their formal political structures. Denmark is a kingdom and Wales 
is a non-sovereign principality, but I don’t think the creation of a 
Republic of Denmark or an independent Wales would dramatically 
change anyone’s sense of what it is to be Danish or Welsh, however 
desirable some of us think the latter would be. 
In this respect, the United States is different. Think about the name I 
just used: in full it does have a geographic reference—this is the United 
States of America—but we speak easily and without ambiguity about this 
nation when we use the purely political term “United States.” This is no 
accident: the American national identity is significantly shaped by our 
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formal and constitutional arrangements. I’m planning to use the word 
“American” in these remarks, but will refer to the nation as “the United 
States” because I want us to keep in mind the fact that this nation is a 
political contrivance, artificial, the product of people making specific 
historical decisions at particular points in time and deliberately turning 
political ideas into political reality. You can ask the date on which the 
United States began—there are, to be sure, competing plausible answers. 
But the question isn’t silly, and deciding which date you think more 
persuasive is a matter of deciding which ideas you think are the most 
fundamental to the nation’s identity. Whatever else it is, the United States 
is an idea or set of ideas. 
My second banal observation takes less time to state: a great many 
people, and I am one of them, think that this is a time of deep and 
disturbing divisions among Americans: some of the lines separating us 
are ethnic, religious, regional or economic, but we are also divided by 
sharp ideological and even philosophical disagreements. The United 
States is a nation built on ideas, but the people of the United States 
disagree about what those ideas are—not just in detail, but (it seems right 
now) at a basic level. It seems likely that a nation so constituted by ideas 
cannot permanently endure radical disagreement about its meaning. In 
such a time, the health, and indeed in some sense the survival of this 
country, depends on finding ways to further a broad national conversation 
about what the United States means, or can mean, to all its people. 
Now let me finally say something that may be faintly original. Here’s 
my claim in a nutshell: I think constitutional lawyers have something 
unique and valuable to contribute to a conversation about the meaning of 
the United States, about the ideas that make up our national identity. 
When I say this, I don’t mean constitutional scholars speaking as political 
theorists or philosophers. Some of us are philosophers, and those who are 
can and should speak in that role. But most constitutional lawyers—and 
I am in this group—are not competent philosophers, and my proposal to 
you today does not rest on identifying—or confusing—legal arguments 
with philosophical ones. I really am suggesting that constitutional 
lawyers speaking as lawyers, as persons with knowledge and expertise in 
a particular and technical area, may have unique insights to bring to the 
question, “what is the meaning and idea of the United States?” 
That may seem, at first hearing, both a little grandiose and quite 
laughable. Expertise in the Internal Revenue Code, sure: if I need a tax 
lawyer I want someone who’s mastered a large and complicated body of 
information and knows how to use that information in effective ways. But 
expertise in constitutional law? Justice William Douglas claimed in his 
memoirs that Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once told him that “[a]t 
the constitutional level where we work, 90 percent of any decision is 
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emotional.”2 Whatever Chief Justice Hughes may have actually said, 
Justice Douglas was expressing what many people genuinely believe 
about constitutional law: it’s nothing more than a matter of dressing up 
one’s moral and political predilections in a certain legal rhetoric, and 
hoping that whoever must make the final decision shares those 
predilections. 
This view of constitutional law is widespread and longstanding. 
Several decades ago, the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre offered a 
somewhat backhanded defense of the Supreme Court of the United 
States’ performance in ideologically driven disputes. In such cases, 
MacIntyre wrote, the Court “plays the role of a . . . truce-keeping 
body . . . negotiating its way through an impasse of conflict, not by 
invoking our shared moral first principles. For our society as a whole has 
none.”3 I agree with MacIntyre that we should not expect the Court to be 
a forum of principled philosophical discussion, but what interests me in 
his comment are his assumptions about law: if law is conflictual, it can 
be neither principled nor a source of genuine unity. For MacIntyre, 
writing in 1982, the paradigm of a constitutional law decision was the 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke affirmative action case, 
in which eight justices disagreed with at least part of the decision’s 
rationale.4 In 2017, it’s generally thought that in many or most 
ideologically fraught cases, eight of the justices are unpersuadable, and 
the decision will turn on the vote of the ninth member of the Court. From 
the perspective of a MacIntyre, fragmented decisions like Bakke, and the 
fact that the same justice is the swing vote in many cases, prove that 
constitutional law is intrinsically conflicted and therefore without 
unifying principles. This in turn reveals the emptiness of talking about 
constitutional lawyers as having real expertise in anything beyond a 
certain kind of forensic rhetoric. 
The interminability of constitutional disagreement is, furthermore, no 
late twentieth-century development. There is no lost, golden era of 
constitutional consensus buried somewhere in the past. During the course 
of a lengthy 1818 congressional debate over the scope of Congress’ 
powers, Representative Henry St. George Tucker (one of the best 
constitutional lawyers of his generation) finally got tired of arguments 
that were substantially the same as those that had divided the First 
Congress in 1791. “Do gentlemen suppose,” Tucker burst out in 
 
2. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939–1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 
O. DOUGLAS 8 (1980). 
3. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 253 (Univ. of Notre 
Dame Press 3d ed. 2007). 
4. See generally Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see 
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exasperation, 
that if, which Heaven permit! this confederation of States shall last for 
a century, we shall, throughout that period, be continually mooting 
Constitutional points, holding nothing as decided, admitting no 
construction to have been agreed upon, and instead of going on with the 
business of the nation, continually occupied with fighting, over and over 
again, battles a thousand times won?5 
I don’t think Representative Tucker would be altogether pleased with 
the 2017 answer to his question. His prayer was granted, and this 
confederation of States has now lasted almost two centuries since he 
spoke. Furthermore, specific constitutional controversies sometimes do 
end in decisions that endure. But speaking broadly, in the last 199 years 
we have been continually mooting constitutional points, and we have 
been fighting constitutional battles of principle over and over again 
regardless of who wins in any particular controversy. 
Thus, constitutional disagreement is not simply the fault of the modern 
Supreme Court or the product of American political polarization in recent 
years; constitutional law has been a field of battle from the beginning. 
Rather than being a means of avoiding ideological or philosophical 
disagreement, constitutional law has served as one of the key venues 
within which such disagreement takes place. Smart constitutional lawyers 
have never thought otherwise. In 1805, Chief Justice John Marshall 
dismissed as naïve the expectation that constitutional law can eliminate 
deep disagreement. Writing specifically about the national bank debate, 
Marshall observed that “[t]he judgment is so much influenced by the 
wishes, the affections, and the general theories of those by whom any 
political proposition is decided, that a contrariety of opinion on this great 
constitutional question ought to excite no surprise.”6 In other words, 
conflict, disagreement, and contrariety of opinion are built into the very 
fabric of constitutional law. 
And that is precisely why (Professor MacIntyre and company 
notwithstanding) constitutional law—and constitutional lawyers—have 
something useful to contribute to any serious discussion about what the 
United States is as an idea in this time of radical partisan and ideological 
division. We are the students of, and participants in, a legal tradition 
marked through and through by radical controversy. We are experts in 
fundamental disagreement. 
Our warring contentions are, on a regular basis, ideological, partisan, 
or both. But as constitutional lawyers we are accustomed to living with 
mutual contradiction without giving up on the common enterprise. In the 
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body of law that is our field of study, we subject even the most divisive 
controversies to traditional modalities of analysis and argument that 
transcend the disagreements and unite the lawyers speaking for the 
contending principles. Constitutional law lives in and through discrete 
and divisive “cases and controversies.” Its continuity lies not in 
empowering the Supreme Court or anyone else to put an end to debate, 
but in affording divided Americans a shared language of thought and 
decision that is continually updated without losing its roots in the past. 
Rhetoric, yes, but a rhetoric that embodies past and present substantive 
reflection on the meaning of the United States. Our unique contribution 
to the national conversation as constitutional lawyers, if we are to make 
one, will come out of our experience of what it is to argue endlessly but 
not pointlessly. 
It’s clear, I trust, that in referring to constitutional law, I mean more 
than the collection of precedents and principles that make up the current 
and binding law that a scrupulous federal district judge tries to apply. To 
see all that constitutional law may reveal about the United States as an 
idea, we need to broaden our picture frame to consider not just what is 
currently authoritative, but also decisions and opinions that we would not 
cite in a brief but that may contribute (perhaps in surprising ways) to what 
the constitutional law tradition has to teach. So I want to encourage us, as 
constitutional lawyers, to play our specific role in the passion and action 
of our time not simply by speaking to immediate, current questions, 
vitally important as doing so is, but by asking of the whole tradition in 
which we are the experts what deeper themes we can identify that may 
shed light on the United States as an idea, that may assist the American 
political community in regaining a shared sense of that meaning. By way 
of encouragement I want to spend the rest of my time today giving two 
brief examples of the sort of inquiry into our tradition I have in mind. My 
main purpose is not to persuade you of my judgments—though a standing 
ovation to indicate agreement is fine—but to indicate the sort of project I 
am commending to you. 
My first example is from a well-known case, Chisholm v. Georgia,7 
decided by the Supreme Court over 200 years ago. But Chisholm is 
perhaps best known for the fact that it belongs to the short and select list 
of Supreme Court decisions overturned by constitutional amendment. 
The Court decided Chisholm on February 18, 1793; by early February 
1795, eleven days short of exactly two years later, enough states had 
ratified the Eleventh Amendment to make it a part of the Constitution and 
thus nullify Chisholm. (Amusingly, as you probably know, no one 
 
7. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
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actually noticed for a few years.)8 As a discrete legal decision, Chisholm 
is as dead as a doornail. However, as no less an authority than Justice 
Joseph Story wrote, in his great Commentaries on the Constitution, the 
justices’ seriatim opinions in Chisholm “deserve a most attentive perusal, 
from their very able exposition of many constitutional principles.”9 So, 
let us take Justice Story’s advice, and consider what the opinion of Chief 
Justice John Jay may have to say about the United States as an idea. 
Chisholm originated in a Revolutionary War supply contract the 
Georgia government made with a South Carolina merchant in 1777: the 
merchant performed but Georgia’s agents never paid him.10 Eventually, 
in 1790 the merchant’s executor, another South Carolina resident named 
Chisholm, sued to collect the debt in the new U.S. circuit court for the 
District of Georgia.11 When that court dismissed his action, Chisholm 
went to the Supreme Court, relying on the high Court’s jurisdiction over 
controversies “between a state and citizens of other states” conferred by 
the Judiciary Act and Article III.12 Acting on the advice of the state 
attorney general, the governor of Georgia refused to obey the Supreme 
Court’s process, so the argument in Chisholm was one-sided in form; 
however, everyone understood the state’s legal objection to federal 
jurisdiction: Georgia is sovereign, sovereigns can’t be sued without their 
consent, Georgia doesn’t consent.13 End of story. Except that with one 
member dissenting, the Supreme Court held that it did have jurisdiction.14 
The four justices in the majority came to their shared conclusion by 
different routes, but it is Chief Justice Jay’s, I believe, that is most 
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(1833). 
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21 (1967). 
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ratified. See Hollingsworth v. State of Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 382 (1798) (“The Court . . . delivered 
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interesting for present purposes. 
The problem with the argument everyone imputed to Georgia, Jay 
thought, was that it rested on an idea—sovereignty—borrowed from 
European political systems and based on what Jay called “feudal 
principles” and “feudal ideas.” To call a European monarch—the king of 
Great Britain, for example—the sovereign was to recognize in him, the 
pinnacle of the governmental system, the “fountain of honor and 
authority,” the source of “all franchises, immunities and privileges.”15 In 
principle, such a sovereign cannot stand “on an equal footing with a 
subject, either in a Court of Justice or elsewhere.”16  
In his Chisholm opinion, Jay rejected all of this. “No such ideas obtain 
here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they 
are truly the sovereigns of the country.”17 This language sounds like an 
American commonplace, but Jay meant it in a deeper and more radical 
sense than it sometimes receives. For Jay, the difference between what he 
called “this land of equal liberty” and feudal Europe was not that the 
king’s role as sovereign had simply been taken over by Georgia and the 
other states, or by the United States, or indeed by the nation and states 
uneasily perched together on what was once the king’s throne. 
Sovereignty in the United States for Jay was not a term that properly 
applies to any part of the political system, national or state. “[I]n 
establishing [the Constitution],” Jay said, “the people exercised their own 
rights, and their own proper sovereignty” not simply to replace a 
hereditary system with a republican one, but to dethrone government 
altogether.18 In the United States, furthermore, he argued that the 
language of “sovereignty” must be linked inextricably to a particular idea 
of “equality,” by which Jay meant the political dignity and moral claims 
of each individual who belongs to the political community: “all the 
citizens being as to civil rights perfectly equal, there is not . . . one citizen 
inferior to another.” The purpose of government therefore lies in “the 
preservation of . . . the equal sovereignty, and the equal right” of each 
individual who is part of the people.19 
For Jay, this controlling idea of equality ruled out Rousseauian 
fantasies about the general will as much as it did the return of King 
George III: when he said that the people established the Constitution, he 
was not invoking an organic or mass society into which individual 
freedom is merged. The Constitution is a social compact, but it is a 
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“compact . . . to govern” ourselves “as to general objects, in a certain 
manner,” and central to that compact is the principle that every individual 
must have effective means of vindicating his or her dignity and rights: 
“true Republican government requires that free and equal citizens should 
have free, fair, and equal justice.”20 Each of us has standing not just as 
against government, but as against the community itself. Citizens of the 
United States “are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to 
govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow 
citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.”21 
If Jay’s understanding of sovereignty and equality is part of the idea of 
the United States, then the notion of “sovereign immunity” on which 
Georgia was relying has no place in our system. The United States, Jay 
said, rests on, 
this great moral truth, that justice is the same whether due from one man 
or a million, or from a million to one man [and] our free republican 
national Government [should] place all our citizens on an equal footing, 
and enable[] each and every of them to obtain justice without any 
danger of being overborne by the weight and number of their 
opponents.22 
In Jay’s United States, the claims of the individual to equal dignity and 
to justice do not disappear in the face of war or fiscal emergency or the 
preferences of the majority.23 
As Jay knew very well, just beneath the surface in Chisholm lurked 
widespread public anxiety, in particular over federal judicial enforcement 
of the peace treaty with Britain, which many feared would disturb post-
Revolutionary land titles and render states financially liable to Loyalist 
and foreign claimants. From many perspectives, such great national 
concerns might very well seem to outweigh in importance a private legal 
action to collect money allegedly owed on a contract, but the Court’s 
decision in favor of Chisholm perfectly illustrates what Jay meant by 
equality: intrinsic to the very idea of the United States is this political 
community’s promise to all its members that each one’s claims matter, 
that no one is beyond the protection of the nation’s institutions, that our 
compact is to govern ourselves in such a manner that we lose sight of no 
individual, even in situations of public tension and concern. This doesn’t 
mean that Jay thought everyone’s rights are exactly the same; that 
children, for example, must have the same freedom of decision as adults. 
But the child no less than the adult is a member of the community, a 
citizen of the United States, and the nation’s institutions must respect and 
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act on that idea. 
Now to say this is to bring us up against a harsh limit that Jay himself 
recognized on the actual scope of his idea of the United States in 1793. A 
couple of minutes ago I quoted the passage in which Jay said that the 
citizens of the United States are all, individually and equally, “the 
sovereigns of the country.”24 But I left out a few words. Let me restore 
the clause: the citizens of the United States are “sovereigns without 
subjects (unless the African slaves among us may be so called).”25 Now 
John Jay genuinely detested slavery, and not just in the abstract way that 
virtually all the Founders did; he was a leading member of the New York 
emancipation movement and as governor signed into law the bill 
providing for the gradual abolition of slavery. “I wish to see all unjust 
and all unnecessary discriminations everywhere abolished,” Jay once 
wrote, “and that the time may soon come when all our inhabitants of 
every colour and denomination shall be free and equal partakers of our 
political liberty.”26 But soon is not now, and Jay recognized that race-
based human chattel slavery made a mockery of the idea of the United 
States as the “land of equal liberty,” where there should be no inferiors. 
Until and unless “all [the] inhabitants” of the United States are “free and 
equal” in dignity and respect, on Jay’s understanding the nation betrays 
its own meaning by giving way to the feudal notion that there are those 
among us who are not our equals.27 
So, what does any of this mean in 2017? I do not want to be misheard 
as suggesting that Chief Justice Jay’s 1793 opinion in Chisholm v. 
Georgia can be transmuted by some sort of intellectual alchemy into a set 
of answers to any of today’s burning questions. For example, I’m not 
claiming that Jay’s opinion tells us what we should do, constitutionally 
or as a matter of policy, about immigration law and enforcement, or about 
the status of undocumented aliens. But if we read Jay’s opinion as a 
proposal for how to understand the idea of the United States, I think it is 
rich with implications for our current disagreements, and so let me take 
immigration as an example. Jay’s careful use, throughout his opinion, of 
the word “citizens” rather than “residents” or “inhabitants,” is a reminder 
that Jay’s concept of equality presupposes the existence of the United 
States as a discrete political community to which not everyone belongs. 
At the same time, the ongoing presence of human beings “among us,” as 
Jay put it, who are not treated equally as part of us, becomes immediately 
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problematic, disturbingly reminiscent (even with all the differences) of 
Jay’s unhappy acknowledgment that the existence of slavery was a 
glaring anomaly in his picture of a people made up of equal sovereigns. 
The idea of the United States, as Jay understood it, precludes in principle 
the existence of any subordinate class or group of human beings within 
the United States, and, as he remarked at one point, demands that we also 
recognize “the justice due to” those who are not part of the United 
States.28 
I’ve left myself time only to mention with telegraphic brevity my 
second example, an opinion written in 1921 by the illustrious Judge 
Augustus Hand, when he and his still more famous cousin Learned Hand 
were both district judges. The opinion was written to explain Judge 
Hand’s reasons for denying the U.S. government’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction in a case called United States v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co.29 Western Union had asked the Wilson administration’s 
permission to land an underwater telegraph cable near Miami, Florida, to 
connect the United States with Brazil, and the administration had said no. 
When Western Union responded that it was instructing its British-flag 
cable layer to proceed anyway, the government informed the company 
and the British ambassador that it was prepared to use force to stop the 
operation. The result was a four-way diplomatic fracas involving the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, and Cuba, and a suit by the 
U.S. government in the Southern District of New York. The Justice 
Department argued that every president since Ulysses S. Grant (with a 
brief hiatus in Cleveland’s second term) had claimed a nonstatutory 
power to grant or deny permission to land submarine telegraph cables on 
American shores. Unmoved by a plausible argument about the 
international embarrassment that might result from a decision in Western 
Union’s favor, Hand denied the government’s request for preliminary 
relief, and the Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the case as moot.30 
Hand’s opinion then disappeared into that abyss that awaits so much hard 
intellectual work by lower court judges. 
A constitutional lawyer of 2017 reading Judge Hand’s 1921 opinion 
will find it strangely familiar. Here’s his reasoning, ruthlessly 
summarized: if the president has the authority to interfere with Western 
 
28. See id. at 476 (“[A]ll questions touching the justice due to foreign nations, or people, ought 
to be ascertained by, and depend on national authority. . . .”). 
29. See generally United States v. Western Union Tel. Co., 272 F. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff’d, 
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OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249–54 (1942); Arturo Gándara, United States-Mexico Electricity 
Transfers: Of Alien Electrons and the Migration of Undocumented Environmental Burdens, 16 
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Union’s plan, that authority must come either from the Constitution 
directly or indirectly through a statute. Neither the vesting clause, nor the 
commander-in-chief clause, nor the take-care clause, nor all of Article II 
taken together, confers any such power. There is no doubt an important 
national interest in regulating the attachment of foreign cables to 
American territory, but, under the Constitution, it is Congress that has the 
power, and Congress has enacted legislation under which Western Union 
can proceed. Whatever authority the president may have to conduct 
diplomacy does not extend to disregarding an act of Congress on a matter 
that Congress may address.31 There you have it: The Steel Seizure Case, 
with Justice Hugo Black’s and Justice Robert H. Jackson’s opinions 
neatly combined, thirty years before Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer! The resemblance to Justice Jackson’s opinion is not accidental: 
in Jackson’s Youngstown files there is a note in Jackson’s handwriting 
with the citation for Western Union Telegraph Co. and a reminder that it 
was Judge Gus Hand who wrote the opinion.32 There is no way to be sure 
that Jackson found the opinion on his own—the brief for the steel 
companies also cited it—but I rather suspect he did. After all, it was 
Jackson who famously joked: “If I were to write a prescription for 
becoming the perfect district judge, it would be always to quote Learned 
and always to follow Gus.”33 
So what, you might say? Since we now have Justice Jackson’s famous 
concurrence, we hardly need Judge Hand’s opinion, but I’m not sure 
that’s right. The Jackson concurrence is celebrated, of course, but lawyers 
tend to focus rather narrowly on what the Supreme Court has called 
Jackson’s “familiar tripartite framework,” and to ignore the rest of what 
Jackson wrote.34 Hand’s opinion can’t be so neatly dissected, and 
therefore brings to the fore the fundamental idea that underlies his and 
Jackson’s thinking. Judge Hand reminds us that questions over the 
existence of executive power, even questions arising out of disputes that 
directly implicate the president’s exercise of his diplomatic prerogatives, 
are—in this republic—questions of law. In a debate over the president’s 
authority to take some action, the assertion, even the correct assertion, 
that it is in the national interest that he or she takes that action is not 
 
31. Western Union Tel. Co., 272 F. at 313–16, 321–23. 
32. See Adam J. White, Justice Jackson’s Draft Opinions in the Steel Seizure Cases, 69 ALB. 
L. REV. 1107, 1110–12 (2006). 
33. Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Why Learned and Augustus Hand 
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34. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015) (citing Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
716 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  49 
conclusive. As Hand wrote: “However true this may be, it does not follow 
that the Executive has the necessary authority.”35 The idea of the United 
States involves at its core a commitment to government by and within 
law, and this commitment does not give way even in the face of genuine 
worries over international affairs and national security. Anyone who 
asserts that this principle must give way to a particular exigency is 
arguing not just for an exception to a legal rule, but for a compromise 
over the meaning of the United States. Once again, my point is not to 
offer, even by implication, an answer to any specific 2017 question. 
Indeed, the fact that Judge Hand wrote almost a century ago, and that the 
legal and political issues raised by his case are of no concern to us today, 
may highlight the enduring significance of his reasoning. 
By now I’ve no doubt exhausted your patience, but allow me to close 
by borrowing a phrase from Justice Jackson in Youngstown. The claim 
that the United States is constituted by an idea or set of ideas that 
Americans share despite our divisions may be destined to pass away. But 
it is the duty of constitutional lawyers to be among the last, not the first, 
to give up on the ideas, and the ideal, for which the United States stands.36 
 
35. Western Union Tel. Co., 272 F. at 313. 
36. Cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (“[M]en have discovered no technique for long preserving 
free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by 
parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of 
the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.”). 
